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ABSTRACT
Significant progress has been made towards making ad hoc net-
works secure and DoS resilient. However, little attention has been
focused on quantifying DoS resilience: Do ad hoc networks have
sufficiently redundant paths and counter-DoS mechanisms to make
DoS attacks largely ineffective? Or are there attack and system fac-
tors that can lead to devastating effects? In this paper, we design
and study DoS attacks in order to assess the damage that difficult-
to-detect attackers can cause. The first attack we study, called the
JellyFish attack, is targeted against closed-loop flows such as TCP;
although protocol compliant, it has devastating effects. The second
is the Black Hole attack, which has effects similar to the JellyFish,
but on open-loop flows. We quantify via simulations and analytical
modeling the scalability of DoS attacks as a function of key perfor-
mance parameters such as mobility, system size, node density, and
counter-DoS strategy. One perhaps surprising result is that such
DoS attacks can increase the capacity of ad hoc networks, as they
starve multi-hop flows and only allow one-hop communication, a
capacity-maximizing, yet clearly undesirable situation.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.0 [Computer Communication Networks]: General—Secu-
rity and Protection; C.2.2 [Computer Communication Networks]:
Network Protocols—Routing protocols; C.2.6 [Computer Com-
munication Networks]: Internetworking—Standards
General Terms
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1. INTRODUCTION
Significant progress has been made in securing ad hoc networks
via the development of secure routing protocols [2, 11, 16, 17,
34]. Moreover, ensuring resilience to misbehavior and denial-of-
service attacks has also been the focus of significant research ef-
forts as such resilience is a critical component of a secure system:
examples include “watch-dog” mechanisms designed to detect and
circumvent misbehaving nodes [27]; rate-limiting of route-request
messages to prevent route query-flood attacks [17]; and “rushing
attack prevention” that seeks to inhibit malicious nodes from at-
tracting an excessive number of routes, which would increase their
ability to inflict damage [20].
Yet, there remains an indefinite “arms race” in system and pro-
tocol design: attackers (or researchers anticipating the moves of
attackers) will continually introduce increasingly sophisticated at-
tacks, and protocol designers will continually design protocol mech-
anisms designed to thwart the new attacks.
The goal of this paper is to quantify via analytical models and
simulation experiments the damage that a successful attacker can
have on the performance of an ad hoc network. In particular, we
recognize that successful attacks are inevitable (at least until the
corresponding counter-DoS protocol modification is deployed), and
our objective is to characterize the relationship between the re-
sources that must be commandeered by the attacker (the percentage
of nodes in an ad hoc network used in the attack) and the impact on
performance of non-attacking nodes, where performance refers to
per-flow goodput and system-wide fairness. In this way, we study
the scalability of DoS attacks and identify the key mechanisms and
factors of both attacks and protocols that affect a system’s DoS re-
silience.
Our methodology is to study DoS resilience via a new and gen-
eral class of protocol compliant denial-of-service attacks, which we
refer to as JellyFish (JF). Although previously studied attackers dis-
obey protocol rules, JellyFish conform to all routing and forwarding
protocol specifications, and moreover, as implied by the name, are
passive and difficult to detect until after the “sting.” JellyFish target
closed-loop flows that are responsive to network conditions such
as delay and loss. Examples include TCP flows and congestion-
controlled UDP flows employing a TFRC-like algorithm [13].
The goal of JF nodes is to reduce the goodput of all traversing
flows to near-zero while dropping zero or a small fraction of pack-
ets. In particular, JF nodes employ one of three mechanisms. The
first JF variant is a packet misordering attack. TCP has a well-
known vulnerability to misordered packets due to factors such as
route changes or the use of multi-path routing, and a number of
TCP modifications have been proposed to improve robustness to
misordering [3, 4, 33, 35]. However, no TCP variant is robust to
malicious and persistent reordering as employed by the JF mis-
ordering attack. The second JF mechanism is periodic dropping
according to a maliciously chosen period. This attack is inspired
by the Shrew attack [25] in which an endpoint sends maliciously
spaced periodic pulses in order to force flows into repeated timeout
phases [25]. The JF periodic dropping attack utilizes the same prin-
ciples but realizes the attack via periodic dropping at relay nodes.
In particular, suppose that congestion losses force a node to drop
x% of packets. As shown in [25], if these losses occur periodically
at the retransmission-time-out timescale (approximately 1 second),
TCP throughput is reduced to near zero even for small values of
x. Thus, a JF periodic-dropping node can drop no more packets
than neighboring congested nodes, but inflict near-zero throughput
on all TCP flows traversing it. Third, we consider a delay-variance
attack in which the attacker randomly delays packets (preserving
order) in order to thwart TCP’s timers and congestion inferences.
This attack not only thwarts widely deployed TCP variants, but also
can disrupt rate-based congestion control algorithms such as [5,
9]. Notice that JF nodes are protocol compliant in that IP’s data-
gram service does not mandate loss-free service, in-order delivery,
or bounded delay jitter.
Finally, in addition to the JF attack, we also study the “black
hole” attack as described in [17]. This attack is relevant for open-
loop flows that do not respond to congestion, loss, or delay infor-
mation, and hence cannot be thwarted by JellyFish. Black Hole
nodes participate in the routing protocol to establish routes through
themselves, yet drop all packets after correctly receiving them at
the MAC layer.
With these attacks (three JF variants and Black Holes), we use a
combination of analytical modeling and simulation experiments to
study the key performance factors that determine a network’s DoS
resilience and equivalently, the attack’s scalability.
Throughout, we consider that victims will diagnose and react
to DoS attacks. Thus, we quantify the relationship between the
timescale of diagnosis and reaction to the attacker as compared to
the route lifetime. Intuitively, if a system has no mobility (and in-
finite route lifetimes), JF will have little effect as nodes will even-
tually discover routes without JF if such routes exist. However,
as mobility increases, the route lifetime shortens and the effects
of JF become increasingly pronounced as the time spent uselessly
transmitting on JF paths and re-establishing routes becomes an in-
creasing fraction of a flow’s lifetime. Thus, we derive an analytical
and experimental relationship that characterizes the impact of these
timescales on flow goodput.
Finally, we study a number of system factors that affect a net-
work’s DoS resilience and obtain the following findings. (i) JF have
a network partitioning effect that severely degrades or altogether
prevents long-range communication. Consequently, an increased
number of JF reduce the system’s fairness index but increase net-
work capacity, as capacity can be increased by starving long-range
flows and serving only one-hop flows. (ii) The mean and distri-
bution of path length have a significant effect on attack scalabil-
ity as higher path length flows are highly vulnerable. (iii) JF are
most devastating in a system with a well balanced offered load. If
a system is heavily overloaded, system performance is already so
poor (high path length flows are already starved), that JF have little
marginal impact. (iv) Random or mobile JF placement performs
nearly identical to optimal-coverage JF placement in systems with
even a small number of JF. (v) JF are most effective in moderate
to high density networks as excessively low density networks may
already be partitioned and JF can do little marginal damage. (vi)
The scaling of the attack with the percentage of JF remains largely
unaffected for large vs. small scale networks. Yet, the absolute
performance is quite different, as without attack, small scale net-
work performance is significantly better than large scale network
performance.
Thus, our goal is not to advance the aforementioned “arms race”
by developing attacks, victim counter strategies, counter attacks,
etc., but rather to explore the impact of a class of attacks that are
difficult and time consuming to detect due to their compliance to
all protocol rules. Yet, we do consider that bad paths will indeed be
diagnosed by victims and routed around (as will be the case with
the JF attack or other yet-to-be-invented attacks) and we study the
key performance factors for attack scalability.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2 we present the JF attacks and an example of their effects on
throughput. In Section 3 we present a simple analytical model that
relates system properties such as mean-path-duration and mean-
path-length to the victim’s throughput. In Section 4 we perform
extensive simulation experiments to quantify the factors that con-
trol an attack’s scalability. Finally, in Section 5 we review related
work and in Section 6 we conclude.
2. JELLYFISH AND BLACK HOLE DOS
ATTACKS
2.1 System Model
Unless otherwise specified, we consider a general mobile ad hoc
network employing a broad set of security and DoS resilience mech-
anisms that (i) ensure node authentication, (ii) ensure message au-
thentication, (iii) ensure one identity per node (preventing Sybil
attacks), and (iv) prevent control plane misbehavior (query floods,
rushing attacks, etc.).
Examples of protocols that achieve the above objectives are dis-
cussed in Section 5, but for concreteness, we can consider a secure
source routing protocol as in reference [17] as well as enhance-
ments such as [19, 20]. Throughout the paper and especially in
Section 3, we discuss the implications of such enhancements, as
well as other counter DoS mechanisms. However, we do not con-
sider deployment of reputation mechanisms, yet discuss such pro-
tocols in Section 5.
The effects of the DoS attacks we describe are independent of
the considered MAC layer protocol. However, in our simulations,
we consider the MAC layer to be IEEE 802.11.
A fraction of nodes are malicious and seek to thwart system per-
formance. A malicious node will always participate in route setup
operations. For example, if source routing is employed, malicious
nodes always relay Route Request packets in order to have as many
routes as possible flowing through themselves; if distance vector
routing is employed, malicious nodes will also obey all control-
plane protocol specifications. However, once a route is established,
attacking nodes will thwart the end-to-end throughput of the flow
via a JellyFish or Black Hole attack. While packets may be en-
crypted at higher layers and become “unrecognizable” (e.g., TCP
vs. UDP) to the network layer, the JellyFish and Black Hole attacks
can still be applied irrespective of the packet types.
2.2 JellyFish Attack
A critical strength of the JellyFish Attack is that it maintains
compliance with all control plane and data plane protocols in order
to make detection and diagnosis costly and time consuming. The
key principle that JF use to facilitate the attack is targeting end-to-
end congestion control. In particular, many applications such as
file transfer, messaging, and web will require reliable, congestion-
controlled delivery as provided by protocols such as TCP. More-
over, TFRC-controlled real-time applications such as interactive
video must also adapt their rates to available bandwidth and hence
also employ end-to-end congestion control.
The dual role of hosts as routers in ad hoc networks introduces a
critical vulnerability for congestion control: specifically, there are
a number of forwarding behaviors that routers (ad hoc relay nodes)
can employ that will severely degrade the end-to-end throughput of
congestion-controlled traffic. We refer to these behaviors as vari-
ants of the JellyFish attack, which we describe as follows.
JF Reorder Attack. TCP’s use of cumulative acknowledge-
ments defines the message “ACK-N” to indicate that all segments
1, · · · , N have been received. Consequently, receipt of duplicate
ACKs is used to infer loss. Yet, because duplicate ACKs can also
indicate an out-of-order packet receipt, TCP has a number of mech-
anisms to increase its robustness to out-of-order packets, including
TCP Sack [12] and reorder robust TCP [35]. Yet, all such TCP vari-
ants assume that reordering events are rare, short-lived, and due to
network events such as route changes.
In contrast, we consider JF nodes to maliciously re-order pack-
ets. In this attack, JF deliver all packets, yet after placing them in a
re-ordering buffer rather than a FIFO buffer. Consequently, we will
show that such persistent re-ordering of packets will result in near
zero goodput, despite having all transmitted packets delivered.
JF Periodic Dropping Attack. Losses due to buffer overflow
are inevitable in congested environments. Kuzmanovic and Knight-
ly [25] show that if such losses occur periodically near the retrans-
mission time out (RTO) timescale (in the 1s range as RTO is in-
tended to address severe congestion), then end-to-end throughput
is nearly zero. An endpoint attack is described in [25] in which
a malicious node transmits periodic pulses into the network. As
the RTO-spaced pulses can force all flows sharing the bottleneck
link to enter repeated timeout phases, the attack results in all such
flows obtaining near-zero throughput while the attacker has a low
average transmission rate. The study showed that the impact of the
attack can be quite severe whether minimum RTO values are all set
to 1 second as recommended in [31], or are randomized over a wide
range.
Here, we utilize the same principle for the JF periodic dropping
attack in which attacking nodes drop all packets for a short dura-
tion (e.g., tens of ms) once per RTO. Thus, unlike [25], JF are pas-
sive and generate no traffic themselves; like non-malicious nodes,
JF drop for only a small fraction of time; yet, with this dropping
pattern during a maliciously chosen period, the following behavior
results. Upon encountering the JF’s first loss duration, the victim
flow will enter timeout as the JF chooses the dropping duration to
be sufficiently long to result in multiple losses. When the flow at-
tempts to exit timeout RTO seconds later, the JF will immediately
or soon after periodically drop again. Note that the JF knows when
a flow enters timeout as the JF itself induced the loss. Thus, the
JF can safely assume that by RTO seconds later, the flow will be
attempting to exit and will be in the fragile slow-start state.
JF Delay Variance Attack. Variable round-trip-times due to
congestion are an inevitable component of TCP’s operation. Yet,
ensuring high performance in the presence of random and high de-
lay variation due to an attacker was clearly not incorporated into
TCP’s design. Such a high delay variation can (i) cause TCP to
send traffic in bursts due to “self-clocking,” leading to increased
collisions and loss, (ii) cause mis-estimations of available band-
width for delay-based congestion control protocols such as TCP
Westwood and Vegas, and (iii) lead to an excessively high RTO
value.
Indeed, enhancing TCP to combat the effects of non-malicious
delay variation to wireless links has been the focus of intense re-
search (see [10] for example), as has the development of tools for
available bandwidth estimation. Consequently, malicious manip-
ulation of packet delays by the JF delay variance attack has the
potential to significantly reduce TCP throughput. Such attackers
therefore wait a random time before servicing each packet, main-
taining FIFO order, but significantly increasing delay variance.
2.3 Impact of JF
We next present simulation experiments that illustrate the effects
of JF on end-to-end goodput. To study these effects in isolation,
we consider a simple “chain” scenario with a sequence of nodes
between the sender and receiver, one of which is a JF. We use the
default IEEE 802.11 MAC at 2 Mb/s and TCP Sack.
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Figure 1: JF-reorder effect on throughput
Figure 1 shows the impact of the JF-reorder attack on the TCP-
Sack flow for different re-ordering. This experiment has a sched-
uler that is a FIFO queue, except that it selects randomly among
the first k packets in the queue. The figure depicts performance as
a function of the re-ordering buffer size expressed in packets.
The figure indicates that TCP is robust to moderate reordering
with a reordering buffer of 2 packets. Whereas, when the reorder-
ing buffer is larger and the reordering is performed in this persistent
and malicious way, TCP throughput collapses. For example, con-
sider the curve with 3 nodes and a 2-hop chain, i.e., a source, des-
tination, and a single relay node. Without an attack (a reordering
buffer of 1), the flow obtains a throughput of 710 kb/s. Yet, with a
reordering buffer of 3 or more packets, the throughput decreases to
approximately 1% of the peak value indicating a successful attack
and near starvation of the flow. That is, if the scheduler selects the
next packet to service randomly among the first 3 or more queued,
the resulting reordering cannot be overcome by TCP. We note that
solutions to TCP reordering such as TCP-PR [4] use only timers
to detect loss vs. duplicate ACKs. Thus, attackers would need to
either use other JF variants for TCP-PR flows or use larger reorder
buffers to force TCP-PR timeouts.
Figure 2 depicts the results of simulation experiments with the JF
periodic dropping attack. Consider first the upper curve in which
the path consists of a source, a single relay node (a JF), and a des-
tination. A time period of 0 indicates no attack and the flow again
obtains a throughput of 710 kb/s. As in [25], the degradation in
throughput to the victim is highly non-linear as a function of the
dropping period, with null frequencies near 0.5 and 1 second (the
minimum RTO value). To obtain the null at 1 second, the JF drops
packets for 90 ms every 1 second, which results in dropping 9%
of the time, and forwarding 91% percent of the time, values easily
incurred by a congested node.
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Figure 2: JF-drop effect on throughput
The attack is therefore successfully exploiting the slow-time-
scale congestion avoidance mechanism of TCP, namely, that flows
must infer that multiple packet losses within a round-trip-time are
an indication of severe congestion, such that the flow must back off
aggressively, and wait RTO seconds before entering slow start. Sig-
nificantly reducing RTO or removing the mechanism all together
would lead to significant spurious retransmissions and potentially
congestion collapse [31], whereas increasing the value would make
the attack even more devastating.
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Figure 3: JF-jitter effect on throughput
Finally, we performed experiments with the JF delay variance
attack in a three node chain. In this scenario, the JF behaves as
a server with vacations, alternating between periods of serving no
packets (and queueing, but not dropping them) and serving packets
at its maximum capacity. Both idle and active periods are of equal
lengths. Figure 3 shows how TCP goodput decreases with increas-
ing jitter (i.e., increasing idle and active periods). While this de-
screased throughput is also due to increased mean delay (i.e., mean
RTT), the figure none-the-less indicates that the effects of this at-
tack can be quite severe.
2.4 Black Hole Attacks
We also consider Black Hole attacks as described in [17]. As
with JF, Black Hole nodes participate in all routing control plane
operations. However, once paths are established, Black Holes sim-
ply drop all packets. Although refusing to forward data is not proto-
col compliant, we also study Black Holes for the following reasons.
First, as demonstrated in the simulations above, JF have nearly the
same impact as Black Holes, making end-to-end throughput col-
lapse until the victim detects and fixes the problem. Thus, in many
simulation experiments, we will consider Black Holes in place of
JF for simplicity. Second, Black Holes allow us to study flows that
are not congestion controlled and therefore are immune to JF. Thus,
we can still study attack scalability for open-loop flows that ignore
the delay, ordering, and loss information that JF are manipulating.
2.5 Misbehavior Diagnosis
Victims of the attacks will measure that they have near zero end-
to-end throughput and will react. Likewise, a malicious node’s
neighbors may attempt to diagnose failed paths due to DoS be-
havior. Clearly, the attacker seeks to inhibit diagnosis in order to
maximize damage. Thus, we next explore network and endpoint
mechanisms for DoS diagnosis with a focus on their practical fea-
sibility, as well as on the timescales for successful diagnosis and
repair. In Section 3 we quantify the effects of these timescales on
flow goodput and in Section 4 we experimentally explore this fac-
tor.
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Figure 4: PACK Limitations
Detection of MAC Layer Failure. Because mobility can
cause routes to break, routing protocols have mechanisms to de-
tect broken routes. For example, DSR uses a MAC layer transmis-
sion failure (indicated by multiple transmission attempts that fail
to generate an acknowledgement) to generate a route error mes-
sage. This message is sent upstream to the source node, which will
subsequently establish a new route. But this will not occur in the
JellyFish nor Black Hole attack as such DoS nodes are protocol
compliant at the MAC layer.
Passive Acknowledgement (PACK). Consider the Black Ho-
le attack in which a malicious node drops all packets. The mali-
cious node must first correctly receive and acknowledge the packet
at the MAC layer (as described above) in order to prevent the up-
stream neighbor from immediately diagnosing a broken route. Yet,
if the Black Hole node fails to forward the packet, can this be de-
tected by eavesdropping neighbors?
Passive Acknowledgements (PACK) [23] as well as “watchdog”
protocols [27] were designed precisely for this purpose. The key
idea of PACK is to exploit the broadcast nature of the wireless
medium: if node i sends a packet to k via j (Fig. 4(a)), then i
should overhear the subsequent transmission from (neighboring) j
to k.
Unfortunately, PACK has three key limitations that preclude its
use as a general solution to such attacks. First, PACK cannot be de-
ployed in combination with dynamic power management. In partic-
ular, continuing with the above example, PACK requires that node
j’s transmissions to k must be overheard by node i. This in turn
implies that j cannot reduce its power level when transmitting to
k, even if the path from j to k has low distance or high SNR. Con-
sequently, precluding the use of dynamic power management (in
order to deploy PACK) not only results in a significant waste of
energy but also inhibits spatial reuse.
Such a scenario is illustrated in Figure 4(a). Here, nodes j and k
are closer than nodes i and j. However, if node j employs dynamic
power management techniques (as in [24] for example) and reduces
its transmission energy when communicating to node k, then node
i will incorrectly infer that node j is misbehaving and will take
action according to the specific routing protocol and counter-DoS
technique. Second, PACK and watchdogs implicitly assume that
attackers will use omnidirectional antennas. If a Black Hole node
uses instead a directional antenna (electronically steerable or sec-
torized), then it can fool its upstream node by beam-forming as
illustrated in Figure 4(b). In particular, the Black Hole node will
beam-form a fake j to k transmission such that i incorrectly in-
fers that k has received the packet.1 This issue will be increasingly
critical as such technologies become widely deployed. Third, as
illustrated in Figure 4(c), a node can also use variable power trans-
mission to thwart PACK. In the figure, i is closer to j than j is to
k so that j can pretend to i to have forwarded the packet, yet j has
reduced its power such that only i and not k can receive it.
In any case, because JellyFish attacks are protocol compliant, it
will be quite problematic for a neighbor to detect their misbehav-
ior. For example, the JF periodic dropping attack can drop packets
at a rate no higher than that of a congested node. Moreover, even
behaving nodes can drop packets in bursts due to the correlation
of a queue state (a full buffer leads to all arriving packets being
dropped until a transmission). Likewise, a high variance in queue-
ing delay may be impossible for observing neighbors to distinguish
from behavior that results from fading channels and variable rate
traffic. Whereas the JF-reorder attack may be the easiest JF variant
to detect via a PACK-like mechanism. Yet, to detect this attack,
IP would need to be changed to mandate in-order delivery, and the
above problems with PACK would need to be solved.
1Clearly, if node i anticipates attackers with directional antennas,
it could then demand a signed acknowledgement from k. Yet, we
do not further study the overhead and performance implications of
such escalations in the “arms race” for the reasons described in
Section 1.
Layer 4 Endpoint Detection. As relying on neighbors to
detect JF and even Black Holes is quite problematic for the rea-
sons outlined above, attack victims will need to rely on end-to-end
mechanisms. The key tradeoff for endpoints will be balancing fast
detection with false positives. At one extreme, endpoints could use
a single packet loss (indicated by a timeout) as a fast indication of
a problematic route. Yet, reacting to the first loss (via a new route
request, for example) would necessarily lead to many false infer-
ences of attack, as congestion, fading channels, etc. can also lead
to loss and timeout.
At the other extreme, endpoints could require a large number of
packets to timeout before inferring that the path has malfunctioned.
In this case, nodes would indeed avoid spurious reactions to con-
gestion. Yet when attackers are truly present, victims would spend
a larger fraction of time before establishing a new successful path.
Thus, endpoints must devise a policy that balances between these
two extremes.
Therefore, a key performance factor of DoS resilience is the di-
agnosis time scale. Given that end-to-end mechanisms are the only
viable solution for attack detection, and that the minimum time for
timeout recommended for even a single congestion-induced loss is
one second [31], we expect detection timescales to be on the order
of several seconds. In any case, we explore a range of values for
this timescale throughout the paper.
2.6 Victim Response
Once a path is diagnosed as providing zero throughput, the end
points will attempt to establish an alternate path. With uni-path
source routing, this will be achieved via transmission of a new
route route request message, typically from the source. When route
replies are received, the victim should avoid paths with any node
from the prior malfunctioning path as the victim does not know
which node on the path was malicious, i.e., the victim has insuf-
ficient information to form an accurate “black list.” Furthermore,
note that as JF are protocol compliant, the victim is not certain
whether throughput collapsed due to an attacker or simply due to
congestion, fading, or other factors incurred in normal protocol op-
eration.
An alternate solution is to employ multipath routing, and to adapt
the path weights according to path goodput as proposed in [17, 30].
Even without attackers, such a protocol must overcome the impact
of different paths having different delay characteristics and the cor-
responding impact on TCP throughput. For example, reference [1,
14] found that TCP Sack’s use of multiple paths in ad hoc networks
led to a severe throughput reduction for even two paths, and near
collapse for three or more paths. The authors then suggest a re-
design of TCP to support multipath routing.
Other promising counter-measures would be the establishment
of backup routes, e.g., caching of all route reply messages for later
use if a current path fails.
In any case, even with multipath routing and TCP re-design, use
of backup routes, etc., a victim flow will always encounter the is-
sues we study next: delays to diagnose and react to the problem,
and poor throughput until all forwarding paths are free of JF.
3. ANALYTICAL MODEL
In this section, we develop a simple model to predict the through-
put of a flow traversing a network in the presence of attacking
nodes.
Consider an ad hoc network with N nodes and a < N attacking
nodes (JellyFish or Black Holes). Denote p as the probability that a
randomly selected node is an attacker such that p = a/N . (We also
discuss other relationships between a, N , and p below.) Consider
a path traversing h relay hops. If the selected nodes represent a
random sample of the N network nodes, then the path contains no
attacking nodes with probability (1− p)h.
We compute the throughput via a renewal argument in which
time alternates between periods of successful transmission and pe-
riods of thwarted transmissions and assume that such durations are
independent and identically distributed. In particular, we denote
E(TL) as the expected lifetime of a route as determined by factors
such as the node velocity and node density.
When a route breaks due to mobility, a number of delays are
incurred in repairing the route. First, a duration Tdiag is incurred to
diagnose that the route is broken. Next, the request for a new route
may be delayed by a rate-limiting duration in order to mitigate the
impact of route query flood attacks. We denote this rate-limiting
time as TRL, which denotes the minimum inter-spacing of route
requests allowed by the routing protocol. Finally, the node must
wait to receive one or more route reply messages, a duration that
we denote as TRR.
After these three phases, a node begins transmitting data on the
new path. However, the new path includes at least one attacking
node with probability 1 − (1 − p)h. If this is the case, the trans-
mission is thwarted and the node must again incur the above three
delays and try again. Note that even if the victim has ensured that
the new route contains no nodes in common with a failed route, the
new route may again contain an attacking node. Thus, a node exits
the zero-throughput phase only after it has successfully established
a route without an attacking node.
In general, a protocol may change timers according to the num-
ber of attempts. Thus we denote superscript n as the attempt num-
ber such that for example T nRL denotes the rate-limiting duration
waited immediately before the nth attempt. Thus, we have that the
total expected time of zero throughput, i.e., the time to find a new
route that contains no attacking node, is given by
E(T0) =
∞∑
n=1
(
n∑
j=1
E(T jdiag) +
n∑
j=1
E(T jRL) +
n∑
j=1
E(T jRR)
)
(1− p)h
(
1− (1− p)h
)n−1
. (1)
More generally, the path length can be represented by a random
variable H such that E(T0) =
∑
h≥0 E(T0|H)Pr(H = h) us-
ing Equation (1) for E(T0|H) along with the distribution of H . To
simplify, we consider a fixed path length (H = h) unless otherwise
noted, and consider the further simplification E(T i) = E(T j)
such that we have
E(T0) =
∞∑
n=1
n (E(Tdiag) + E(TRL) + E(TRR))
(1− p)h
(
1− (1− p)h
)n−1
. (2)
The normalized goodput for a flow is given by
E(TL)
E(TL) + E(T0)
(3)
which under the above assumptions reduces to
E(TL)
E(TL) +
(
E(T ndiag) + E(T
n
RL) + E(T
n
RR)
)
(1− p)−h
. (4)
We make several observations about Equation (4). First, note the
corner case with p approaching 1 or high route length send goodput
to 0. Another corner case is a scenario with no mobility: in this
case, once a successful route is established, it is never subsequently
broken and goodput approaches 1.
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Figure 5: Attack Scalability and Path Length
Intermediate cases are depicted in Figure 5, which illustrates
goodput (computed from Expression (4)) as a function of the per-
centage of attackers p = a/N for three route lengths of 3,6, and
9 relay nodes. We consider a mean route lifetime of E(TL) = 10
s, which corresponds to a high node velocity of Vmax = 30 m/s
as reported in [32]. Moreover, the curves depict the case that the
diagnosis, rate limit, and route reply times are 2 s, 2 s, and 1 s
respectively. The diagnosis time is set to two times the default re-
transmission timeout value for TCP: a lower value would certainly
lead to false inference of broken routes. The 2 second rate limiter
value is the default value for DSR for the minimum spacing of route
requests, which is increased in DSR to 10 seconds for subsequent
requests (not shown here).
The figure indicates that without any attacking node, legitimate
nodes spend approximately 66% of their time successfully trans-
mitting, and the remaining 33% having broken routes and trying to
re-establish routes due to mobility. Note that even though nodes
can retransmit packets lost during this time, or even delay trans-
mission during phases of broken routes, this result indicates that
the flows will obtain 66% of the throughput that they would have
obtained in a static scenario without mobility. Next observe the
scalability of the attack for 6 relay nodes: with 10% of attacking
nodes, the goodput drops to 52%, whereas with 20% of attacking
nodes, the goodput drops to 34%. The impact of the attacker is
even more pronounced in large-scale networks in which a longer
path length is increasingly likely to include an attacking node. For
example, with 9 relay nodes, the goodput decreases to 44% under
10% attacking nodes and to 21% under 20% attacking nodes.
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Figure 6: Impact of the Rushing Attack
The model also allows us to explore the impact of a “Rushing
Attack” as described in [20]. In rushing attacks, malicious nodes
use different mechanisms to attract flows to route through them,
thereby increasing the damage they can do during attack. For ex-
ample, suppose an attacking node could transmit at (and receive
from) twice the distance of other nodes. In such a case, this node
would attract a disproportionate number of flows to route through
itself as the “shortest path route” would, with a high probability,
go through this long-distance hop. Figure 6 characterizes the effect
of an attacking node being able to attract two and four times the
number of flows due to a rushing attack for path lengths of 6 relay
nodes. In this case, the probability of a flow not being intercepted
by an attacking node is decreased to (1 − 2p)h and (1 − 4p)h re-
spectively.
The figure indicates that when the rushing attack is combined
with either of our two DoS attacks, the impact can be quite devas-
tating. For example, if attacking nodes are able to attract twice as
many flows as compared to that achieved in a uniform graph (i.e.,
2a/N vs. a/N ), the flow goodput drops from 52% to 34% with
10% of attackers. Furthermore, if attacking nodes can attract four
times as many flows, the goodput nearly collapses to 8.5% under
10% of attackers. Thus, in addition to quantifying the impact of
rushing attacks, this result illustrates the critical importance of pre-
venting rushing attacks. As a number of techniques were proposed
in [20] to thwart such misbehavior, we do not consider it further,
and in all experiments we do not give attacking nodes any advan-
tage in attracting routes.
4. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE
UNDER DOS ATTACK
In this section, we perform an extensive set of simulation ex-
periments to quantify the impact of DoS attackers on performance
and to identify the key factors that determine an attack’s scalability.
After describing our methodology, we establish a baseline case and
then isolate the impact of each factor.
4.1 Methodology
Attackers affect performance in a number of ways. The perfor-
mance metrics below allow us to evaluate the impact of JF on indi-
vidual flows, as well as on the whole system performance.
• System fairness: To measure fairness, we use Jain’s fair-
ness index computed using long-term throughput averages
and given by [21]:
FJ =
(Σmi=1γi)
2
mΣmi=1γ
2
i
(5)
where m is the total number of flows and γi is the proportion
of received packets of flow i during the simulation time. FJ
is equal to 1 when all flows equally share the network, and is
equal to 1/m when a single flow monopolizes all resources
(in which case FJ → 0 when m →∞).
• Number of hops for received packets: We consider random
topologies with random traffic matrices. However, JF and
Black Holes can have the effect of starving multihop flows
and giving all the capacity to one-hop flows that (by defini-
tion) have no relay nodes and hence do not encounter JF. This
performance measure captures this effect and also character-
izes network partitioning in which multihop communication
becomes impossible.
• Total system throughput: This measure characterizes the re-
ceived throughput aggregated over all network flows. Pro-
viding all capacity to one-hop flows and starving others can
be the capacity-maximizing allocation of bandwidth to flows.
Thus, JF and Black Holes often increase total system through-
put.
• Probability of interception: This characterizes the probabil-
ity that a flow encounters a JF in its path. This probability
depends on many factors such as the placement of JF, the
traffic patterns, the percentage of JF etc. Moreover, all the
previously mentioned performance metrics depend on this
probability.
Experimental and simulation results showed that delays and jit-
ters in ad hoc networks vary considerably. Therefore they provide
no relevant information to be considered in our analysis.
An attack’s effectiveness is a function of a number of system
parameters. We consider the offered load, the congestion control
protocol, the JF placement strategy, node mobility, and node den-
sity. We next assess the effect of these parameters on the perfor-
mance metrics described above by varying them one at a time. We
use ns-2 simulations and present results averaged over 50 simula-
tion runs, using 18 different topologies / mobility scenarios (8000
simulations in total). We show the corresponding 95% confidence
intervals. Each simulation is 500 s, and results are obtained after
a warmup period of 100 seconds. Unless otherwise specified, we
use Black Holes to emulate the effects of JellyFish on TCP, as the
latter were shown in Section 2 to result in near-zero throughput,
resulting in a near identical effect as Black Holes. Moreover, JF
can have a slightly stronger effect: for example, with JF, re-ordered
and delayed packets are still transmitted end-to-end, consuming ad-
ditional capacity while not contributing to goodput. To simplify the
presentation, we designate the attacking nodes as JF throughout the
section; in practice, however, they are Black Hole nodes in the case
of UDP flows and JellyFish nodes in case of TCP flows. Degraded
channel conditions (e.g. noise, fading etc.) are harmful compo-
nents to the system performance. Therefore we consider a clear
non-fading channel to assess the impact of the JF attacks.
4.2 Baseline
For the baseline simulations, we consider a scenario in which
200 nodes move randomly in a 2000m×2000m topology, at a max-
imum velocity of 10 m/s, pausing for 10 s on average. Nodes use
the IEEE 802.11 MAC with a node receive range of 250 m. The
channel capacity is 1 Mb/s. 100 of these nodes communicate with
each other to create 50 flows. UDP packets are transmitted at a
constant rate of 800 bits/s, corresponding to one 500 byte packet
every 5 s. The other 100 nodes route packets without generating
any flows, and are henceforth called “routers.” JF are compromised
routers among these 100. For the baseline, JF are statically placed
on a grid as shown in Fig. 7.
Figure 8 shows that in the absence of JF, one-hop flows ac-
count for approximately 8% of received packets, with the remain-
ing packets nearly uniformly allocated to flows up to 5 hops, and
then longer-path-length flows accounting for significantly less.
(Note that there is a smaller number of flows having very long paths
due to the random traffic matrix.)
However, with 25 JF (12.5% of nodes), the percentage of re-
ceived packets corresponding to one-hop flows increases to 20%,
and with 49 JF (25% of nodes), the percentage increases to 33%.
In each case, this advantage to one-hop flows comes at the cost of
multihop flows. For example, under 25 JF, 5 hop flows have their
throughput cut in half and 10 hop flows become nearly starved.
This indicates that the attack has nearly prohibited long-range com-
munication such that the network is in effect partitioned, allowing
only short-range communication.
dd
2xd
2xd
2xd 2xd dd
W
d = W / (2 x sqrt(# of JF))
Figure 7: JF placement in a grid
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Figure 8: Distribution of the number of hops for received pack-
ets
Figure 9 shows the impact of JF on system fairness. Observe
that with no JF, the system has a relatively high fairness index of
0.9 indicating that flow rates are not significantly different. How-
ever, with an increasing proportion of JF in the network, the fair-
ness index significantly decreases, indicating that some flows are
obtaining a significantly higher throughput share at the expense of
other flows.
Figure 10 explains the phenomenon. The figure depicts the mean
hop length for a received packet. Without attack, the mean is 6.6
indicating that a significant number of packets are received on long-
path-length routes. Yet, as the number of JF grows, the average path
length for a received packet diminishes: fewer and fewer pack-
ets are able to traverse long routes leading to increased capacity
for one-hop flows. Figure 8 illustrates the unfairness: long paths
are increasingly likely to be intercepted by JF, considerably reduc-
ing their share of the system capacity, whereas the short-path flows
“benefit” from the attack.
4.3 Offered Load and TCP
The system’s offered load is an important factor for the scalabil-
ity and impact of the JF attack. At one extreme, if the offered load
is very high, most packets received end-to-end will be over one hop
flows even without the attack, so that JF can do little if any addi-
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Figure 9: Fairness Index for the baseline case
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Figure 10: Average number of hops for received packets
tional damage. At the other extreme, with a more moderate load,
JF will skew the distribution of received traffic more towards that
achieved in an over-load case.
To study this effect, we consider an offered load per flow of 5
times that of the baseline. Moreover, we consider the offered load
that TCP will achieve for 5 and 50 TCP flows. The rest of the
parameters remain the same as in the baseline scenario.
The curve in Figure 11 with an offered load of 5 times that of the
baseline case illustrates that an overloaded network has a fairness
index of 0.4 without any JF, even below that obtained under the
baseline load with 25% JF. Thus, there are too few multihop flows
for the JF to even slightly degrade the fairness index, i.e., repeated
collisions and buffer overflow severely impede multihop traffic.
For TCP traffic, TCP congestion control does not attempt to pro-
vide equal throughput to all flows (which would achieve a fairness
index of 1). Instead, it seeks to provide throughput that is inversely
proportional to round-trip-time. However, the situation with 50
TCP flows is quite similar to that of the CBR overload case: the
JF have little effect on fairness, as one-hop flows are dominating
the percentage of packets received end-to-end, even without the at-
tack.
With 5 TCP flows, Figure 12 indicates that without the attack,
40% of received packets are from one hop flows whereas with 49
JF, this percentage increases to 69% of received packets. Thus, the
attack increased the number of one-hop packets by 73%, resulting
in a significant impediment to multihop traffic.
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Figure 11: Effect of offered load
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Figure 12: Hops for received packets with different TCP loads
Next we measure the total system throughput as a function of
the percentage of JF and present the results in Figure 13. For the
baseline case, the figure shows that an increasing percentage of JF
results in progressively lower system throughput as an increasingly
high number of flows become thwarted by the attack for the reasons
discussed above. However, the results are quite different under 5x
system load and for 50 TCP flows. For the case of 5x system load,
the total system throughput has nearly doubled under 12.5% of at-
tackers when compared to no attackers, thus indicating that a DoS
attack can increase the capacity of an ad hoc network. Although
initially surprising (at least to the authors), the reason is quite sim-
ple: JF prevent multi-hop communications, thus liberating signif-
icant capacity, which is used by one-hop flows. Thus, Figure 13
shows how misleading capacity can be to express the impact of
DoS: communication still continues to take place, but only with
one hop neighbors.
We also observe that even under high loads, the behavior is non-
monotonic. The reason is that the existence of surviving flows de-
pends on the topology and node movements: if JF happen to stop
a flow that potentially interferes with others, the overall through-
put will increase. Otherwise, system throughput is reduced by the
thwarted flow’s throughput. This dependency on the topology and
movement makes the confidence intervals2 very large, in spite of
averaging over 18 different mobility scenarios of 50 runs each.
2Not shown, for clarity.
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Figure 13: Normalized system throughput with different loads
Thus, with the given topology dimensions of 2000m×2000m
and a high offered load, having 200 nodes with a receive range
of 250m each and a 500m interference range, the first JF added will
most likely reduce contention and interference, thus increasing sys-
tem throughput. But beyond a certain number of JF, no flows can
take advantage of this removal of interfering flows anymore, and
the system throughput starts decreasing.
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Figure 14: Hops for received packets with different CBR loads
Figure 14 illustrates this issue from an alternate perspective and
depicts the average number of hops for a received packet under
different loads. The figure shows that the presence of JF severely
diminishes the allowed path lengths for successful communication
in both the baseline and the overload cases.
4.4 JellyFish Placement
The baseline scenario considers grid placement as shown in Fig-
ure 7. Here we analyze the effect of different JF placement methods
on the effectiveness of the JF attack and consider two additional
methods: (i) random static placement in which JF are uniformly
randomly placed within the geographical area, yet are non-mobile,
and (ii) mobile JellyFish in which JF nodes have the same mobility
characteristics as all other nodes.
Figure 15 shows the probability that an established route con-
tains a JF node for the different placement techniques. From Sec-
tion 3, we have that the probability of interception is given by
Pint = 1 − (1 − a/N)
h for a fixed number of relay nodes h.
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Figure 15: Probability of interception Pint for different JF
placement methods
As also described in Section 3, this expression is easily generalized
to incorporate the hop count distribution via
Pint =
∑
h≥0
(1− (1− a/N)h)Pr(H = h) (6)
where Pr(H = h) is the probability of having H = h relay
nodes. The figure indicates that the simplified model which con-
siders path length to be constant overestimates the number of in-
tercepted flows. In contrast, by using the path length distribution
as obtained from simulations together with Equation (6), the curve
labeled “Model (general)” provides a close match with simulation.
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Figure 16: Fairness for different JF placement methods
Finally, Figure 16 indicates that grid placement and mobile JF
are only slightly more harmful than random static placement. Al-
though perhaps surprising that mobile and random placement is
nearly as effective as grid placement’s optimal coverage, the 2000m
×2000m topology together with 250 m receive range and 200 nodes
imply that most of the considered area is covered with any of the
placement techniques considered here, making them perform al-
most equally.
4.5 Mobility
The lifetime of a path is affected by the lifetime of the con-
stituent relay nodes. That is, a path breaks when a single node on
the path moves out of radio range of its upstream or downstream
node. Thus, mobility is the key factor that controls path lifetime
and we study this effect here.
Figure 17 depicts fairness for received packets for three mobility
speeds, 1 m/s, 10 m/s and 20 m/s, with 10 m/s representing the
speed in the baseline case. Without attack, low mobility provides
the best fairness as higher mobility hurts long-path-length flows in
much the same way that JF hurt long-path-length flows. When there
are 49 JF in the system (24.5%), the speed is of less importance, as
all three speeds suffer high equivalent damage under attack.
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Figure 17: Fairness for different velocities
4.6 Node Density
In the baseline case, we consider a 2000m×2000m topology
with 200 mobile nodes. Here we consider a scenario with 1/2 the
density in which 100 nodes are placed on a 2000m×2000m topol-
ogy. Moreover, we consider a scenario with 1/6.25 of the density
in which 200 nodes are placed on a 5000m×5000m topology.
Figure 18 shows that for very low densities (baseline/6.25), the
average number of hops is relatively low (4.7 hops) in spite of the
large dimensions of the topology. In fact, due to the low density,
the network is not fully connected such that long-range flows are
unlikely to exist.
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Figure 18: Hops for received packets for different densities
This partitioning is also visible from the fairness point of view
as depicted in Figure 19. The figure indicates a significant decrease
in fairness when the node density decreases to such low levels.
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Figure 19: Fairness for different densities
With an increasing number of JF, system performance degrades
similarly in the three cases. However, for the lowest density, the
degradation is considerably less as fairness is already quite low
even with no attackers.
4.7 System Size
Finally, we explore the effect of system size on attack scalabil-
ity. In particular, as demonstrated in Section 3, the mean hop length
plays a critical role in an attacks effectiveness. Here, we consider
a 1000m×1000m system vs. the 2000m×2000m case of the base-
line, and keep the node density constant resulting in 50 nodes.
Observe first from Figure 20 that without an attack, the mean hop
length for a received packet is reduced by a factor of approximately
2 . Moreover, this factor is maintained across different percentages
of JF as shown. Thus, the attack scalability remains unchanged
with system size, yet the mean path length has a significant effect.
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Figure 20: Hops for received packets for different system sizes
A similar trend is illustrated in Figure 21 which shows that a
smaller system size results in higher initial fairness. That is, with
shorter path lengths, flow throughputs are nearly identical. (Con-
sider a small system in which all flows are within radio range: if
the MAC protocol provides long term fairness, then the fairness in-
dex will be 1.) Yet, both system sizes obtain a similar scaling of a
reduction in fairness with an increasing number of attackers.
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5. RELATED WORK
Significant recent research efforts have focused on the challenge
of securing mobile ad hoc networks with most work targeted to-
wards securing routing protocols. Results can be classified accord-
ing to the routing protocol(s) they consider and by the assumptions
they make in terms of available security mechanisms (e.g., on-
line/offline presence of an identity and key certification center, key
distribution and revocation techniques, and cryptographic compu-
tation capabilities of the nodes). Other relevant parameters include
the number of nodes, the mobility model, the underlying transmis-
sion protocols (MAC and physical layer), the propagation model of
the radio channel, as well as the strength of the attacker (e.g., the
number of controlled nodes).
In this section, we present an overview of related work in se-
curity in ad hoc networks with an emphasis on the mechanisms
aiming at protecting against DoS attacks.
Securing Routing Protocols. The area which has attracted
the most attention is security of the routing protocol and in partic-
ular, security of route establishment.
Ariadne [17], proposed by Hu, Perrig and Johnson, protects sou-
rce routing protocols such as DSR against a number of attacks.
They propose a protocol to secure the routing discovery phase and
to ensure that all forwarded packets follow the secure route. As
they mentioned, this protocol does not protect the network against
a legitimate but malicious relay node, which silently discards all or
part of the packets. The two suggested counter-measures in [17] are
Passive Acknowledgement and multi-path routing, both of which
we discussed in Section 2 and the latter is also discussed below.
Reference [17] also suggests blacklisting poorly performing nodes
in order to prevent them from being included in future routes; we
treat this issue below when discussing reputation-based systems.
In [17] Hu et al. also consider a route-request-flooding attack,
which without counter-measures can be quite devastating, as each
Route Request message generates a broadcast throughout the entire
network. The proposed solution consists of having every node rate
limit the Route Requests it is asked to relay. Although such a mech-
anism is indeed needed to protect the system from such attacks, we
showed in Section 3 that such rate limiting can also delay a vic-
tim’s ability to respond to an attack, and consequently will reduce
the throughput of victims.
Hu et al. address the problem of securing distance vector proto-
cols and have developed a protocol termed SEAD (Secure Efficient
Ad hoc Distance vector routing protocol) [16]. In order to guard
against several attacks including DoS attacks, SEAD makes use of
one-way-hash chains and Merkle hash trees. The purpose of these
structures is to authenticate the metric (distance to the target) and
the sequence numbers (which are used in distance vector to assess
the freshness of the information about a given route and, if not prop-
erly protected, could be exploited to mount attacks). They conclude
that distance vector protocols are more difficult to secure than those
based on source routing. In any case, we note that SEAD does not
consider attacks against packet forwarding, nor does it address the
use of multiple routes.
Other studied attacks include the Rushing Attack [20] (discussed
in Section 3) and the Wormhole Attack [19]. Finally, [18] provides
a description of four new mechanisms as tools for securing distance
vector and path vector routing protocols; however, these mecha-
nisms aim at protecting against attacks that are different from the
those considered in this paper.
Finally, other proposals about secure routing protocols focus on
secure route establishment and explicitly exclude packet dropping
from their field of investigation [11, 34]; we do not comment on
them, as they are quite remote from our topic.
Usage of Multiple Routes. Papadimitratos and Haas devel-
oped the Secure Routing Protocol (SRP) [29] with a focus on us-
ing multiple routes. Unlike Ariadne, SRP relies exclusively on the
mutual authentication of the end nodes (source and destination);
hence, it does not require any authentication of the relay nodes,
which makes the protocol more light-weight, but also more prone
to attacks. For this reason, they have devised another, complemen-
tary protocol, termed SMT (Secure Message Transmission proto-
col) [30]. The principle of SMT is that the source and destination
make use of an “Active Path Set” that consists of diverse, preferably
disjoint paths that are initially deemed valid. The source disperses
each outgoing message into a number of pieces. This operation in-
troduces redundancy such that at the destination, a dispersed mes-
sage can be successfully reconstructed, provided that sufficiently
many pieces are received. Each dispersed message is transmitted
across a different route and carries a Message Authentication Code,
so that the destination can verify its integrity and the authenticity
of its origin.
As selection of the optimal Active Path Set is an NP-complete
problem, the Disjoint Pathset Selection Protocol is proposed to
choose a set of reliable paths in nearly linear time [29]. An evalu-
ation of the lifetime and of the size of the path set is provided via
simulations. Although this approach is a promising building block
to thwart DoS attacks, it has two limitations. The first, noted in
[29], is the assumption that the MAC layer is implemented over
channels that are well separated in time and frequency; in other
words, there can be little correlation between transmissions from
one node to its neighbors as a stronger correlation would certainly
lead to a much smaller number of independent paths. The second
limitation, related to the first one, is that the simulations do not
include the effects of a MAC layer nor of TCP, both of which sig-
nificantly impact performance in this scenario.
Securing Packet Forwarding. In order to mitigate attacks on
packet forwarding, Marti et al. proposed Watchdog and Path Rater
[27]. At the same time, Buttyan and Hubaux proposed the usage of
a virtual currency, the nuglet [7]. More recently, Buchegger and Le
Boudec devised the CONFIDANT reputation system [6], in which
a node observes the behavior of its neighbors and updates its opin-
ion about each of them accordingly. Michiardi and Molva proposed
another reputation-based system, named CORE [28].
All such schemes rely on observations. Yet, as JellyFish are pro-
tocol compliant, it will be difficult for neighbors to observe their
misbehavior. Indeed, if attackers thwart PACK as described in
Section 2.5, such neighbor-based detection is impossible. Alterna-
tively, victims could share and cross correlate information about the
nodes on poorly performing paths and eventually build confidence
as to which nodes are JF. Although a time consuming and challeng-
ing task, one can presume that it can eventually be solved in many
cases. In this context, our study should be viewed as characterizing
the damage that JF can do until such a protocol can ensure that all
JF are eliminated.
Finally, Jakobsson, Wetzel, and Yener describe a number of ste-
alth attacks against ad hoc wireless networks [22]. This work in-
cludes the description of several relevant attacks, including DoS
attacks, and suggests that a solution requires an appropriate reputa-
tion system. Although Jakobsson et al. present a thought-provoking
overview of novel attacks, their work [22] does not contain quanti-
tative results, as is the focus of our work.
Identification of the Attacking Node(s). We have consid-
ered that once a victim has detected a DoS attack, it will establish
a new route. A more sophisticated reaction would also attempt to
identify the attacking node(s) on the route exhibiting the anoma-
lous behavior. For this purpose, Awerbuch et al. propose a tech-
nique aiming at identifying a “Byzantine node” on a given route
[2]. The technique requires that the destination acknowledge ev-
ery packet to the source; when the source detects that the number
of lost packets is higher than a given threshold, it performs a bi-
nary search on the path in order to identify the faulty link. For that
purpose, it polls specific nodes via probes and asks them to reply.
The protocol targets having a malicious node be unable to distin-
guish between polling packets and normal ones, and be unable to
know whether the source has started a probing session. Although
a promising technique, this proposal has been investigated in static
scenarios and its effectiveness with mobility is still unproven.
Other Techniques. Other researchers have studied packet for-
warding from the context of incentive techniques. In this case, ra-
tional nodes attempt to maximize their benefit (e.g., their bitrate)
of using the network; an example is SPRITE, by Zhong, Chen and
Yang [36]. As such, these nodes do not aim at perpetrating DoS
attacks.
All research efforts mentioned so far are focused on the network
layer. The only study of Denial of Service at the MAC layer of ad
hoc networks that we are aware of is by Gupta, Krishnamurthy and
Faloutsos [15]. This work shows how vulnerable IEEE 802.11 can
be to DoS attacks; it focuses more on the description of the attacks
than on a way to thwart them.
A final topic, loosely related, is key establishment in ad hoc net-
works. Perhaps the first work in this area is by Zhou and Haas [37],
but more recently, Luo et al. have proposed a scheme for access
control in mobile ad hoc networks based on threshold cryptogra-
phy [26]. Finally, Capkun, Hubaux and Buttyan have shown how
mobility can be exploited to support key establishment [8]. These
research efforts are quite remote from our topic, and we do not dis-
cuss them here.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied a novel DoS attack perpetrated by Jel-
lyFish: relay nodes that stealthily misorder, delay, or periodically
drop packets that they are expected to forward, in a way that leads
astray end-to-end congestion control protocols. This attack is proto-
col-compliant and yet has a devastating impact on the throughput
of closed-loop flows, such as TCP flows and congestion-controlled
UDP flows. For completeness, we have also considered a well-
known attack, the Black Hole attack, as its impact on open-loop
flows is similar to the effect of JellyFish on closed-loop flows.
We studied these attacks in a variety of settings and have pro-
vided a quantification of the damage they can inflict. We showed
that, perhaps surprisingly, such attacks can actually increase the ca-
pacity of ad hoc networks as they will starve all multihop flows and
provide all resources to one-hop flows that cannot be intercepted by
JellyFish or Black Holes. As such a partitioned system is clearly
undesirable, we also consider fairness measures and the mean num-
ber of hops for a received packet, as critical performance measures
for a system under attack.
We assessed the effects of various performance factors (number
of attacking nodes, mobility model, detection time, system size,
etc.) on the above metrics via a simple analytical model and a sub-
stantial number of simulation experiments. In this way, we provide
a quantitative study of the performance impact and scalability of
DoS attacks in ad hoc networks.
Our objective is to provide guidelines for protocol designers who
are developing DoS-resilience mechanisms: with a better under-
standing of the key attack factors and how to evaluate the impact of
an attack, protocol designers can better determine if the overhead
of deploying a counter-strategy is merited given the damage that an
attack can inflict.
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